The Rohingyas have not and are not migrating to Bangladesh for ‘food security.’ They fled and are fleeing even today to Bangladesh because of threats to their lives, writes Mohammad Abdur Razzak
THE foreign affairs adviser’s statement of on April 27 to the media on humanitarian channel sparked debates and discussions across political, security and academic domains. The adviser said, ‘According to the United Nations’ proposal, Bangladesh has agreed in principle to allow a humanitarian corridor to Rakhine. It will be a humanitarian passage. However, we have certain conditions. I will not go into details. If the conditions are met, we will certainly provide assistance.’ The statement, apparently a benign gesture, is at the crossroads which could draw Bangladesh into a geopolitical vortex
Since the eviction of a million of Rohingyas from Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, the three districts bordering Bangladesh, evolving events are making the situation challenging for Bangladesh. The Myanmar junta’s loss of 14 out of th 17 in the Rakhine State, including a stretch of 270 kilometres of land borders with Bangladesh and Bangladesh’s shaky foreign policy to engage or not with a non-state actor has drifted the leverage away from Bangladesh.
The politically restive Rakhine has turned into a zone of conflict. It has become the epicentre of quadrilateral power plays. China has grand economic and political interests which could invoke military presence for protection. The United States has the Burma Act binding on both the Republicans and the Democrats. The Burma Act is eventually a ‘China neutral policy in Myanmar.’ Russia has a good arms market in Myanmar. Whatever it comes to, Russia will continue its support Myanmar. India’s most immediate and visible interest in Rakhine is the survival of its Kaladan Multimodal Transport Transit which began in 2013. India, which has invested 23 billion Indian rupees in the project, has problems with the presence of both he United States and China there. India would welcome China-neutral project of the United States in Myanmar but will have serious discomfort with US interference there.
Among the three districts remaining in junta’s control are Sittwe township, the administrative capital of the Rakhine state, Kyaukphyu, a district having economic, political and military significance to both China and junta government, and Munaung.
The junta government has a naval base about seven kilometres southeast off the Kyaukphyu airport, an under-construction submarine base on the Ohnkhyun Island, about 13 kilometres east off the Kyukphyu airport and China’s 100,000-ton oil terminal on Madey Island, about 17 kilometres southeast off the airport. The Chinese oil and gas pipeline spanning 752 kilometres run from here to Kunming in the land-locked Yunan province. The Shwe gas field in the Bay of Bengal with a proven reserve of 5.4–9.1 trillion cft is on the west of the Kyukphyu coast where China has 51 per cent stake. The oil pipeline is designed to discharge 12 million tons of oil a year. Besides, China has planned to build a deep-sea port on Ramree Island, south off the Kyukphyu township and a high-speed commercial railway line connecting Ramree Island with Kunming in China. The Kyaukphyu district is also the gateway to China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. China is building a massive 400 by 120 metre dry dock on the bank of the River Yangon with a capacity to dock 40,000-ton vessels not commensurating Myanmar’s naval and commercial inventory now and in the future.
Against the backdrop of the geopolitical and military complexity and sensitivity, China and Myanmar’s junta will suspect the issue of ‘humanitarian channel from Bangladesh into Rakhine State’ to have an element of military incursion as hidden stake. Military incursion does not necessarily imply boots on the ground but may be interpreted as supply of military logistics.
The United Nations has not declareed which part of the of the Rakhine State is famine-stricken. The Rohingyas have not and are not migrating to Bangladesh for ‘food security.’ They fled and are fleeing even today to Bangladesh because of threats to their lives. By any consideration, Rakhine has turned into a zone of conflict.
A channel leading up to a conflict zone will demand security between the point of origin and the point of delivery and the distribution of humanitarian aid. In this case, who will be the receiver of humanitarian deliveries? The whole arrangement of transport, delivery and distribution will need the cooperation of the party having control on the ground. It is, in this case, the Arakan Army.
The Myanmar junta’s suspicion is very strong that any deliveries through the channel would strengthen the Arakan Army’s position in Rakhine State and increase its war-making potential. The junta will, therefore, employ conventional and unconventional means to disrupt the passage of goods through the channel. The junta’s intervention is likely to have a pull effect on Bangladesh.
The junta does not have the capacity to fight back the Arakan Army in the lost territories. The military option that it can employ to disrupt any potential aid convoy is air power. Myanmar started building an air base at Kyaukhtu in Magway Division in 2018–2019, about 220 kilometres off the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. The base has a 3,000+ metre runway and moderate military infrastructure to conduct combat air operation. The air base was developed to operate Su30 and MiG 29. An aerial strike to disrupt ‘humanitarian supplies’ has the risk of pulling Bangladesh into a conflict. Myanmar might deliberately strike the point of origin and expand the conflict into the maritime frontiers. Bangladesh must weigh its response to the United Nations’ call for the humanitarian channel and its potential pull effects.
Mohammad Abdur Razzak (safera690@gmail.com.com), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh navy, is a security analyst.
