Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing ended his first state visit to China since the 2021 coup on Saturday.
He was invited by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Eurasian security summit led by China and Russia, as a dialogue partner, and to Beijing for the WWII Victory Day parade.
During the trip, he met with Xi and Vice President Han Zheng and inked MoUs with Chinese firms for investment in Myanmar.
Here’s what you need to know about Min Aung Hlaing’s latest trip to China—including why it mattered for him, what he told Xi, whom he met, and how he viewed the visit.
1. First official recognition since 2021 coup
Unlike his previous trip in November last year, Min Aung Hlaing’s eight-day visit to China last week came at the official invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping—a first since his military coup in 2021. The junta described the Aug.30-Sept. 6 trip as a working visit to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and World War II victory day parade in Beijing.
China also addressed Min Aung Hlaing as “acting president”, recognizing his self-conferred new title. During last year’s trip, he was referred to merely as “Myanmar leader.”
Analysts said China’s treatment of Min Aung Hlaing signals a transition from partial to full backing— economically, militarily and diplomatically—of his embattled regime, as it seeks to quell a nationwide rebellion and protect Chinese investments in Myanmar. Beijing has Belt and Road Initiative projects worth billions of dollars in the country.
2. Gratitude for China’s pressure on EAOs
Min Aung Hlaing personally expressed his gratitude to Xi Jinping for aiding his regime by exerting pressure on anti-regime ethnic armed organizations in northern Myanmar.
The junta suffered unprecedented defeats during the EAO-led Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in 2023 and 2024, losing a huge swathe of territory from the Chinese border to near Mandalay in central Myanmar, including Lashio, the northern Shan capital, and the Northeastern Regional Command.
Soon after, China began leveraging its influence over the EAOs to push for ceasefires—throwing a lifeline to Min Aung Hlaing’s regime.
Min Aung Hlaing’s personal thank-you revealed the extent of Beijing’s involvement in Myanmar’s internal affairs, including border stability, dialogue and peace processes. In contrast, China portrays itself as a neutral mediator in these issues.
3. A meeting that could make China uneasy
Min Aung Hlaing’s Aug. 31 meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the SCO summit delivered a potential blow to hosts China.
They discussed border stability, trade promotion, military cooperation, and Delhi’s support for the junta’s planned election, according to press releases issued by both sides.
But on Facebook, Modi wrote that he and the junta boss also saw “immense scope” to boost ties in rare earth mining.
Modi’s mention of the rare-earth trade is likely to ring alarm bells in China, the world’s largest exporter of the critical mineral, sourced largely from mines in Myanmar’s northern Kachin State.
However, it’s unclear how rare earth ties between the junta and India could work, as the mining hubs are still controlled by the anti-regime Kachin Independence Army.
What is more certain is that Beijing will not be happy with the content of the discussion.
4. Hero-Worshipping Kim Jong Un
Wielding a nuclear arsenal to cement his repressive rule and threaten the West, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un serves a role model for dictators everywhere.
After his personal meetings with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the junta boss must have been dreaming of an audience with Pyongyang’s “dear leader”.
Luckily, the dream came true last week when leaders from 26 countries gathered in Beijing for the WWII victory parade.
The junta boss and Kim Jong Un met briefly in the VIP waiting room for a handshake and small talk. But the photos reveal it was a momentous occasion for Min Aung Hlaing. He refused to let go of Kim’s hand, his face lighting up like a child meeting his hero for the first time. What they discussed remains unknown.
Myanmar’s military has long-standing ties with North Korea. In 2008, under the previous military regime, a high-level Myanmar military delegation led by then-junta No. 3 Thura Shwe Mann made a secret seven-day visit to Pyongyang via Beijing, signing agreements that strengthened military cooperation.
The visit aroused concerns, especially in the West, about the Myanmar military’s nuclear ambitions.
Myanmar’s elected government expelled a North Korean diplomat in 2017 for suspected links with a UN-sanctioned company, but relations seem to have normalized since the 2021 coup.
5. The most successful trip so far!
After sealing Beijing’s official backing for his regime with the invitation from Xi Jinping, Min Aung Hlaing couldn’t resist bragging about his latest trip to China.
Speaking to reporters in Chengdu on Saturday, he said he had visited the giant neighbor 12 times, before and after the coup, and added: “I would like to say that this trip has been the most successful one so far.”
The boast was not empty: without Xi Jinping’s endorsement, he would have relied solely on Moscow for legitimacy. The West ostracized him for his coup and deadly crackdown on protesters while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has banned him from summits over his failure to honor the bloc’s peace plan.
Before the 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing had only ever visited China as military chief or, last year, on a non-state trip. This time, to his delight, he was granted an official invitation and addressed as acting president—securing his long-craved legitimacy from a world power.
He promptly told Chinese media that relations between the nations were at an all-time high, calling Myanmar a trustworthy and good neighbour. It would have been more accurate, however, to say, “this trip has been the most successful one so far for me.”
6. Seven MoUs
The junta signed seven memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with China during the dictator’s visit. Two forged cooperation between Myanmar entities and Chinese business associations, but neither side provided details on the specific projects.
The most strategically significant deals, however, involved companies tied to the Myanmar military and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Among the signatories were Shwe Than Lwin Holding Company, backed by the military, and China Harbor Engineering Co. Ltd. (CHEC). The latter is central to Myanmar’s infrastructure development in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).
Another MoU was signed between Yunnan Baoshan Hengyi Industrial Group (HYIG) and Myanmar’s Transland Public Co. Ltd., formalizing cooperation on the Myanmar section of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) international corridor.
The strategic positioning of these projects, integrated into larger regional corridors, underscores China’s aim to secure influence over critical trade routes and connectivity with India and Southeast Asia.
