On December 28, Myanmar will begin its long-delayed election process. The National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) — controlled by the military — is the only remaining body with constitutional legitimacy after the coup and has set the date as the first phase of a staggered process. However, under current conditions, only about one-third of constituencies are expected to participate in the elections. This arrangement ensures that the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), a transitional body set up by NDSC, will retain its mandate and control beyond the polls through a supervisory role over subsequent phases, even if a new parliament and administration are formally installed. The Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces, or MAF) has redesigned the political process and structure to allow for its continued grip on power.
Institutional (Re)design
In the August 1 reshuffle, the Burmese military dissolved the State Administration Council and introduced an interim governance system to be in place until the election. In this system, NDSC sits at the top as the origin of authority for government institutions. Under NDSC, SSPC and the cabinet stand in parallel but retain very unbalanced duties and weights. The cabinet, led by Prime Minister Nyo Saw, is tasked with managing day-to-day government administration. The SSPC, however, holds seniority, directing political strategy and electoral management.
The relationship between SSPC and NDSC is deliberately complex and tricky. On the surface, the SSPC and cabinet derive their legitimacy and mandate from the NDSC. In reality, however, SSPC and NDSC are intertwined but serve different operational purposes. The NDSC functions primarily as a meeting mechanism, while the SSPC is the dominant political organ. This division ensures that administrative responsibility lies with the cabinet, and political authority remains concentrated in the SSPC.
Information from Naypyitaw suggests that the SSPC is designed as a transitional body that may be replaced by a permanent commission after the election, under the constitutional mandate in Articles 20(b) and 20(c). Such a commission would be autonomous from parliament and the cabinet, operating independently rather than under civilian authorities. The arrangement is designed to ensure that Min Aung Hlaing can retain influence over the armed forces even after retirement if he seeks the presidency.
Electoral Engineering
The regime’s August 15 announcement regarding constituencies demonstrated how this design works. In the Lower House, 330 seats are up for election while 110 are reserved for the military. In the Upper House, 168 are up for election while 56 are reserved. Although all 330 elected Lower House seats will be contested, only 110 seats in the Upper House will open, with 58 left vacant. These vacant seats represent ethnic minority areas, with officials claiming that security concerns make polling there impossible. State and regional assemblies will follow a similar pattern, with many constituencies uncontested. This imbalance reduces ethnic representation, hampers the opposition’s ability to form a presidential coalition, and lowers the bar for a military-backed candidate to secure the presidency.
Under the 2008 Constitution, three vice presidents are nominated by the elected members of the Lower House, the elected members of the Upper House, and the military, respectively. The combined parliament then votes, and the candidate with the most support becomes president. In theory, this could allow a candidate chosen by the Lower House to win. But in practice, the military is guaranteed 25 percent of seats in both houses, and the decision to leave many Upper House constituencies vacant increases the MAF’s chances of picking two presidential candidates, rather than just one. This arrangement reduces the number of additional seats that the military requires to pick its preferred candidate in the Upper House. At the same time, political parties must achieve far broader representation across both chambers to compete.
Regime Priorities
Within this framework, the SSPC and cabinet are pursuing three interlinked priorities.
The first is the elections. The December poll will create legitimacy for the government structure in areas where elections are held. While SSPC works and manipulates the process through subsequent phases to ensure results favorable to the military, the ambiguity allows SSPC to retain authority in the interim.
The second is the economy. With the Myanmar Kyat trading at more than 4300 Kyat per U.S. Dollar on black markets, the government has imposed strict controls on imports, tightened foreign exchange control, and restricted border trade. These measures are blunt but are intended to reduce demand for dollars, narrow the exchange rate gap, and project an image of some stability before the election.
The third is the military’s central role in Burmese politics. The MAF’s so-called “fourth generation” reform aims to transform it into a constitutional military within a nominally civilian political order. Russian-trained officers are driving changes in doctrine, drone warfare, surveillance, and training, while conscription has already added 70,000 recruits and is expected to exceed 100,000 after the election. These measures are framed through a nationalist narrative that presents the military as the state’s guardian, drawing lessons from the post-Soviet experience.
The election strategy also serves an operational purpose for the military. Elections will not take place in contested areas in December, but the regime is linking ongoing counteroffensives to the phased election process, aiming to extend administrative control and incorporate these regions in later rounds. Through this process, MAF is incorporated into the state’s structure both operationally and politically.
Regional Recognition and Succession
International reactions to the December poll are expected to diverge. Western governments are unlikely to recognize the legitimacy of the election, seeing it as exclusionary and inconsistent with the conditions of free political participation. In contrast, Myanmar’s neighbors — China, India, and Thailand — are positioned to endorse the process as a stabilizing measure. Their assumption is that a new administration, even if quasi-civilian, will be more accessible for engagement and could open space for dialogue that would be more difficult under direct military rule. For Beijing, recognition is linked to protecting infrastructure and energy corridors; for New Delhi, it is about securing its own northeastern frontier; and for Bangkok, it is about ensuring predictable coordination on border management. Within ASEAN, the Five-Point Consensus remains the formal framework. Still, some member states may assume that a new administration could provide an opening to advance that process in ways the current leadership has resisted.
Min Aung Hlaing is expected to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin at the end of August. While Myanmar is an observer and not a formal member of SCO, its participation will demonstrate broader external acceptance of the regime beyond its immediate neighbors. Recognition from SCO member states would provide the post-election administration with a degree of recognition, diminishing the damage from the absence of Western endorsement.
The SCO summit also offers a glimpse of Myanmar’s potential future leaders. Observers in Naypyitaw suggest that the officials accompanying Min Aung Hlaing to the SCO summit may be positioned for senior cabinet or military roles in the next phase. With the SSPC as the primary institutional framework, any successor will inherit a system designed to preserve military authority regardless of individual preferences.
Conclusion
The December election will not resolve Myanmar’s conflict. Still, it represents the military’s attempt to re-establish a political order while securing its central role in politics — also the objective of the 2008 Constitution. Elections, economic controls, and military reform are being deployed as a coordinated strategy to maintain MAF influence under a constitutional framework and to secure external recognition.
At the same time, the process is likely to produce a quasi-civilian administration that neighboring countries could engage with, both to stabilize border relations and to create space for discussions on conflict de-escalation. China, India, and Thailand see the next administration as a vehicle for reducing cross-border tensions and managing instability, even if substantive political reconciliation remains uncertain.
For the outside world, the key question is not whether the December poll will transform Myanmar’s political order — it will not — but how regional governments will leverage the incoming administration for dialogue and stability. The election is designed by the MAF to ensure continuity. But the region hopes for new opportunities for conflict management through quasi-civilian structures that regional partners are prepared to engage with and recognize.
