Members of Myanmar’s Union Election Commission speak during a demonstration of voting machines to be used in future elections in
The junta’s pledge to hold elections by the end of this year or early next may seem like a delusional fantasy. The military and its State Administration Council (SAC) may control as little as 50 or even 40 per cent of the country, which is what the resistance and some Western analysts claim. Whatever the figure, huge parts of the country remain beyond the reach of the authorities in Naypyitaw. In areas where people could actually go to the polls, local election officials are being assassinated by forces opposed to any junta-orchestrated election. So, who is going to vote, where and how? Politicians and activists in most Western nations will most certainly dismiss the outcome as fraudulent, and continue to shun the military and its institutions. Sanctions and boycotts will remain in place.
Despite all these obvious reasons for not holding a general election at the time the SAC has announced, Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces have to carefully consider what is likely to happen. Instead of mocking the SAC’s promises of a “nation-wide election”, they have to wake up to some bitter realities. China will accept the process as well as the outcome unreservedly. India, Bangladesh, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and perhaps Japan as well, will most certainly argue that even a flawed election is better than nothing and a step in the right direction. Australia, which has a long history of attempting to “engage” military regimes in Myanmar, may also argue that it is better to do exactly that, to engage rather than isolate whoever is in power in Naypyitaw. The Swiss and the Scandinavians are likely to continue their costly — and futile — efforts to bring peace to Myanmar, which also means that they have to engage the military. And the generals are shrewd enough to turn the entire process to their advantage, meaning recognition for themselves without having to make any concessions to ethnic and other rebels.
All these various and likely scenarios are bound to bring a huge degree of legitimacy to the government once it has been formed after the elections. It will also lead to a tacit acceptance of what will beyond doubt be military rule under a different guise. Myanmar’s closest ally Russia will praise the outcome of the election, no matter how imperfect it may be. But that is irrelevant in the context of regional geopolitics. It is Myanmar’s neighbors in the region that count. And they have shown—long before any elections have been held—that they are prepared to work with the authorities in Naypyitaw.
As I pointed out in a guest column for The Irrawaddy’s website on April 23, the March 28 earthquake inadvertently provided the military authorities with a rare opportunity to interact with foreign, mainly regional, rescue teams, which flocked to Myanmar. Then, on April 3, SAC boss Min Aung Hlaing traveled to Bangkok to attend a summit of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). He had meetings with leaders of the governments of Thailand, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Min Aung Hlaing was treated as an equal, and no one questioned his stated position as prime minister of Myanmar.
China also made its stance clear when, on May 9, President Xi Jinping met Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of Russia’s May 8 Victory Day celebrations in Moscow. According to a report in the junta’s official newspaper, The Global New Light of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing thanked China for its humanitarian assistance following the earthquake. It did not seem to matter that the Myanmar air force kept up its bombing campaign against places also in earthquake-affected areas controlled by the resistance.
It is still unclear how many parties will participate in the election and it would be wrong to speculate which exactly they could be. But it does not really matter as long as the list includes the military’s own Union Solidarity and Development Party, perhaps another Burman party, and some ethnic parties. That would be enough for countries in the region to endorse the election and its outcome. The National Unity Government, which was set up by MPs elect and others after the 2021 coup, will find itself out in the cold.
And Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces also have to realize that they cannot expect any support from the United Nations and its agencies. Its current secretary general, António Guterres, pledged at a news conference four days after the 2021 coup that “the United Nations will do everything it can to unite the international community and create conditions for the military coup in Myanmar to be reversed.” But the only actions Guterres has taken since then are a series of statements urging the military to refrain from using violence against civilians. UN agencies continue to cooperate with military authorities in Naypyitaw and whatever humanitarian aid they provide has to be channeled through junta-controlled entities. Independent researcher David Mathieson, writing for Asia Times on June 2, 2023, called the UN system “dysfunctional, bloated and corrupt”, stating that UN efforts are “highly unlikely to produce any meaningful progress for Myanmar people on the ground.”
Not even the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague — which on November 27, 2024, requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing for crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingyas — can be relied upon as a blame-free institution with integrity. Karim Khan, ICC chief prosecutor, has been forced to take a leave of absence pending the outcome of an ongoing investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct. The Wall Street Journal reported in May that one of Khan’s former aides, a lawyer from Malaysia in her 30s, told UN investigators he had “forcible sexual intercourse” with her during missions abroad and in The Hague. Khan has denied the accusation, but the case has received worldwide attention—not because of Myanmar, but because he is also the prosecutor who has submitted applications for arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a former defense minister of Israel, and two leaders of the militant Palestinian organization Hamas.
On the ground in Myanmar, it would be unfair to downplay the battlefield successes the various resistance forces have had since the coup. The military has suffered many humiliating losses and lost control of large parts of the country. Myanmar has not seen fighting this heavy and widespread since the years immediately after independence from Britain in 1948. But it is hard to detect the existence of any central command coordinating activities on the scattered battlefields. Resistance is localized and that leaves it open to pressure and manipulation from the only country that has the means to do so: China. We have seen that in northern Shan State, where the Chinese forced the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies to give up Lashio. Capturing the city and the Northeastern Command, which is based there, in July last year was a major, unprecedented success for the resistance. And now the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, an MNDAA ally, is coming under pressure to vacate Hsipaw and Kyaukme, which like Lashio are major towns on the highway from China to Mandalay. The fighting in northern Shan State has disrupted the lucrative cross-border trade, and also threatened the implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will give China access to the Indian Ocean.
But that still leaves the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Arakan Army (AA), the Karen National Union (KNU), and the various forces in Chin State over which China has much less leverage. Those ethnic armies have also been successful, but whatever alliances they have with Burman resistance groups are of a tactical nature only. They are buffers which keep the Myanmar Army away from areas controlled by them. They will defend what they see as their respective homelands and have no interest in marching into Naypyitaw, Yangon or even Mandalay.
I am convinced that the vast majority of people of all nationalities in Myanmar, and their supporters, would have liked to see different scenarios being played out after years of fighting that has claimed thousands of lives and uprooted entire communities. But wishful thinking will not lead to change. Only a sober analysis of the situation on the ground will result in actions that could lead to a way out of the present malaise and secure a brighter future for a country that has suffered for far too long.
