A humanitarian corridor of such a kind would surely not be in India’s interest, given the potential that it holds for increased infiltration of refugees, movement of drugs and Myanmar-based militant groups into the Northeast
A humanitarian corridor for the displaced Rohingyas of Myanmar’s Rakhine state, through Bangladesh, has been an idea that the United Nations has been promoting ever since the Rohingya crisis began. However, after UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited Bangladesh in March 2025, this idea has gained greater traction. The corridor’s exact location has not been made public, but it would be fair to assume that it would be astride the Naf river at Teknaf (southeast of Cox’s Bazar) to Maungdaw in the Rakhine state of Myanmar.
The creation of such a corridor could potentially involve Bangladesh in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. The interim Muhammad Yunus government readily agreed to this proposal of the UN. However, in Bangladesh, this decision came under criticism from other political parties, academics and security experts because it would lead to further cross-border movement of Rohingyas, thus increasing the risk of cross-border smuggling, trafficking of drugs, weapons and humans; all at the cost of internal stability. The Bangladesh Army chief, Gen. Waker-uz- Zaman, has also raised strong objections, in fact he has clearly told Mr Yunus not to go ahead with the proposal. A holistic look at the stakeholders involved in this humanitarian corridor and their likely stand on this is, therefore, necessary to understand the issue better.
On the Myanmar side the stakeholders are the military junta, the Arakan Army (which is fighting the junta) and the people of Rakhine itself. The junta, though now not in control of vast parts of Rakhine state (14 of the 17 cities in Rakhine state are under control of the Arakan Army), is still holding out at the key locations of Sittwe and Kyukphu; the former being the important sea port for the India-led Kaladan Multi-Modal Trade and Transit Project (KMMTTP) and the latter being the deep sea port of the Chinese (where China has invested $7.3 billion). The junta has indulged in large-scale excesses against the Rohingyas over the years, and would surely not agree to this corridor.
The Arakan Army was formed in 2009 with Chinese help, a year after the inking of the India-led KMMTTP in 2008, possibly in order to disrupt the KMMTTP. Further, it is still largely backed by the Chinese, and has been oppressive against the Rohingyas. They are said to be the gatekeepers to the Chinese Kyukphu port now and are thus unlikely to allow this humanitarian corridor. Insofar as the people themselves, they include both Buddhists and Muslims (in Rakhine, Buddhists constitute 52.2 per cent of the population, while Rohingya Muslims, who are the oppressed, constitute 42.7 per cent). The corridor would, however, have the support of the Rohingyas and their militias, which include ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (its chief, Ata Ullah, was born and brought up in Karachi); the ARA (Arakan Rohingya Army) and the RSO (Rohingya Solidarity Organisation), though all three don’t have the military muscle now to defeat either the junta or the Arakan Army. A Pakistani effort to arm them in the future is very likely.
For Bangladesh, a country that already has over a million Rohingya refugees, the opening of such a corridor makes no sense, notwithstanding the carrot that the UN seems to be offering that this corridor would eventually pave the way for re-settling the Rohingyas in Rakhine. The Yunus government’s explanation for accepting the UN offer also seems to be for enabling the rehabilitation of the Rohingyas. However, this corridor would also question Bangladesh’s sovereignty. Further, given the strong opposition that the Rohingyas face both from the junta and the Arakan Army, it is very unlikely that they would ever be able to cross back into Myanmar. The estranged relationship between the junta and the Bangladesh military, including Border Guards Bangladesh, also doesn’t help matters. It may also be noted that humanitarian corridors planned and sponsored by the UN earlier have failed in most cases; Sudan, Yemen, Ukraine and Syria are some examples. So, is the corridor perhaps a ruse by the West to provide military aid to the Arakan Army at a later date, to make it pull away from Chinese influence and fight the junta? It’s also a question that comes to mind.
This proposed corridor would also adversely affect the security situation in India’s Northeast. With the increased engagements the unelected Muhammad Yunus government is undertaking with both China and Pakistan, and given the recent Operation Sindoor clash between India and Pakistan, it would be fair to assume that there would be increased collusive and vested interests between Pakistan and China to foment trouble in the Northeast. The recent killings of 10 Myanmar-based militants at Chandel in Manipur by the Assam Rifles on May 15 may just be a sign of things to come. A humanitarian corridor of such a kind would surely not be in India’s interest, given the potential that it holds for increased infiltration of refugees, movement of drugs and Myanmar-based militant groups into the Northeast. Further, a corridor like this would have long-term implications of continued conflict between the junta and the Arakan Army, thereby destabilising the security situation in Rakhine, which would further delay India’s flagship KMMTTP that is now increasingly becoming the only alternative to the Siliguri choke, given Bangladesh’s increased hostility towards India. In all this cacophony, the UN’s appeal for a humanitarian corridor also begs the question: why aid only for Rakhine state? Why not the other states and regions of Myanmar which are witnessing battles between the junta on the one hand against the Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs) and the People’s Democratic Front (PDF) on the other? Surely, it is for somebody else’s interest; in all likelihood, that of the United States. The US role in parachuting Muhammad Yunus as the interim head of Bangladesh last summer is well known and it is no surprise therefore that the US sees an opportunity to enter Myanmar, where the Chinese influence reigns supreme. The UN, at least the humanitarian aid vertical, appears to have now become an instrument for the extension of US policies and interests. The interim Yunus government will be a complicit handmaiden working to push the US agenda. After all, besides the anti-India bluster, the only oxygen the Yunus government is surviving on is the support of the radicals in Bangladesh and the invisible, but assured, US support, notwithstanding the 37 per cent tariffs and the complaints President Donald Trump has raised about human rights violations in Bangladesh. The days ahead would thus see multiple contestations. India has to be watchful and be proactive over any move that is not in its national interest.
