In mid-April, the arrival in Dhaka of three United States State Department officials, two deputy assistant secretaries and the charge d’affaires in Naypidaw, signaled the first signs of a critical engagement between US officialdom and the Muhmmad Yunus’s interim government since it took charge in August 2024.
Following the August 2024 political transition, Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Yunus appears to have adopted a new geopolitical orientation, seemingly opening the country to Western interests, both political and economic.
The Bangladeshi media had little to report on what precisely was discussed about Myanmar. But the involvement of the newly appointed National Security Adviser (NSA) Khalilur Rahman in the controversial issue over the repatriation of Rohingya refugees and the appointment of Sufiur Rahman, a former ambassador to Myanmar, as Chief Adviser Yunus’s special assistant in the Foreign Ministry, is by far the clearest evidence that Dhaka will play a key role in a security matrix that includes the US and Myanmar.
Since the arrival of United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in Dhaka in March, when the Rohingya repatriation issue took center stage, and the discussions that the three State Department officials had with key functionaries of the Yunus administration, there has been a notable shift in Dhaka’s focus on facilitating “humanitarian” aid to Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
Initially, efforts by Bangladesh centered on repatriating 1.4 million Rohingya refugees from the Cox’s Bazar camps where they have been living in terrible conditions since 2017.
However, a new tack involved advocating a “humanitarian corridor” to the Rakhine State, citing ostensible “famine-like conditions” and “starvation” in the non-Rohingya region controlled by the Arakan Army.
Bangladeshi analysts have severely criticized the Yunus government’s proposed humanitarian corridor, which is seen as lacking “legitimacy under international law” as it would be initiated “without the consent” of the Myanmar government, which in turn could raise “serious legal and diplomatic concerns”.
There has been close engagement between the Bangladesh authorities and the Arakan Army since at least December 2024. However, analysts point out that “recent unauthorized incursions [into Bangladeshi territory], including cultural engagements, heighten the risk of cross-border instability and challenge national sovereignty”.
This pitch for a humanitarian corridor for the Rohingya repatriation is interpreted by some as a way to build a link that would provide US-backed logistics and supply support for the Arakan Army.
While there are claims that the humanitarian corridor could be used for funneling “non-lethal” supplies to the Rakhine State, in line with the objectives of the US’ Burma Act, the role that the Bangladesh Army might play in channeling logistics and provisions to the Myanmar region could have a security dimension.
The Bangladesh Army could, in principle, play a crucial role in providing logistics and supplies to the Arakan Army. Bangladeshi and Indian media reports suggest a deepening tie between the US and Bangladeshi militaries, reflected in the confabulations between a senior American general and the Bangladeshi Army establishment. While this highlights the influence the US is currently exerting in the region, the evolving geopolitical situation is complicated by the role that China might play in the context of Myanmar.
Recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Myanmar military junta chief Gen. Min Aung Hlaing met in Moscow where the former expressed support for Naypidaw’s development “suited to its national conditions, safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national stability, and steadily advancing its domestic political agenda”.
This could only mean full Chinese support to the junta in the event the Arakan Army seeks to launch a military offensive aimed at capturing Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung townships.
While China has been a staunch ally of the Myanmar military junta, it made significant investments in Kyaukphyu in the Rakhine State, most notably a special economic zone and a deep-sea port, and in other parts of Myanmar which Naypidaw controls.
This strategic Rakhine State township is the “terminus” of a US$1.5 billion oil and natural gas pipeline that runs to Kunming in China’s Yunnan province. Besides, Chinese projects under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are sources of concern for the economic leverage that Beijing would exercise over Naypidaw.
Besides Kyaukphyu, the Rakhine State capital, Sittwe, is also a strategic township as it forms a critical link in India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that aims to provide an “alternate outlet” to the country’s landlocked northeast.
There is no denying that Myanmar in general, and the Rakhine State in particular, are geo-strategically important for both China and India, which explains why Beijing and New Delhi have maintained ties with the military junta. New Delhi has not made any statements on the Arakan Army’s growing closeness with Dhaka, but it will be keen to protect its interests in the Rakhine State. On its part, Dhaka too will have to contend with Myanmar’s military junta, which will likely not agree to the “humanitarian corridor” proposal since their agreement will be essential. This will not only leave the Rohingya in limbo but defeat the very purpose of the humanitarian passage originally aimed at repatriating them to their home districts in the Rakhine State where there is continuing violence and uncertainty.
So, far from resolving the Rohingya issue, the Bangladesh interim government’s proactive policy on the Rakhine State, the Bangladesh Army’s role in providing supplies to the Arakan Army, the likely opposition by the Myanmar military junta to the proposed humanitarian corridor and China’s unstinted support to safeguard Naypidaw’s territorial integrity could turn the region into a geopolitical hotbed in the months to come. — The writer is a senior lecturer at Centre for Peace Studies, North South University, Dhaka. The article is republished under a Creative Commons license.
