Before their latest fighting, India and Pakistan fought three wars, and those experiences suggest that conflicts between these two countries rarely remain confined within their borders. Bangladesh inevitably feels the ripple effects. Much like during the India-Pakistan cricket matches, Bangladesh finds it difficult to remain emotionally neutral or indifferent to their armed confrontations.
This is not solely due to their geographical proximity. Their shared religious and sociocultural heritages also formed a connection over the centuries. These inseparable connections are why it often feels like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India are members of a vibrant, albeit feuding joint family. The “past” may have politically divided these societies, but their separate “presents” have not emotionally detached them from one another. On the first day of the latest conflict, a friend working at a leading national daily informed me that their viewership had tripled. It’s not just curiosity—it’s a reflection of collective anxiety, nostalgia, and unresolved identity questions that still echo from the subcontinent’s traumatic history of Partition and its aftermath.
However, besides shelling Pakistan, India has also initiated a massive push-in operation along its borders with Bangladesh, further complicating regional dynamics. So far, according to the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), Indian forces have pushed around 300 individuals into Bangladesh, including Rohingya, through remote border areas in Satkhira, Khagrachhari, Moulvibazar, and Kurigram. Some of these people are reportedly Bangla speakers and have come from Gujarat. If some among them were really illegal Bangladeshi migrants residing in India, that issue could have been addressed through formal channels. Instead, India has simultaneously launched push-in operations at multiple border points, which is clearly unjust and contrary to diplomatic norms.
Those already pushed into Bangladesh have claimed that various Indian agencies on the other side of the border are gathering more Bangla-speaking individuals. Many Rohingya who migrated to India from Arakan are also reportedly being assembled. These developments are deeply concerning. It is hard to believe that Indian policymakers do not understand how such actions would upset and anger the Bangladeshi government and people.
To respond to the push-in, Bangladesh may inevitably be compelled to initiate a pushback programme. While that may appear inhumane, the government has no real alternative. The border situation is bound to get heated up due to such back and forth.
This development is especially significant in light of the relentless propaganda war Bangladesh has faced from some segments of Indian media since the ouster of the Awami League from power in August last year. The nature of Bangladesh government should be a matter solely for the people of Bangladesh to decide. India may understandably be uncomfortable with the political changes here, but engaging in widespread misinformation campaigns targeting an entire country and its people is downright antagonistic.
Additionally, amid such hostile propaganda and aggressive push-in efforts, Bangladesh is also facing a tense situation along its southern border.
During the tenure of the interim government, the illegal entry of Rohingya refugees from Arakan has surged. The population in the refugee camps is now close to 13 lakh. A major concern for Bangladesh regarding these new and old refugees is the visible decline in international financial assistance. The question is, why has there been a renewed influx of Rohingya from Arakan? The new wave of refugees claims that they are facing security threats from the Arakan Army.
The Arakan Army has already taken control of approximately 80 percent of the Rakhine state. At the same time, the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, continues bombing various parts of the region. This ongoing conflict has created a severe humanitarian and security crisis. In response, the United Nations has recently requested Bangladesh to open a channel towards Arakan to facilitate the delivery of international humanitarian aid.
Now, there are precedents for such channels or corridors being established by third countries in conflict or war-ravaged zones. The UN initiated similar efforts in Gaza and Ukraine in recent years, but the outcomes were far from satisfactory. Those experiences failed to achieve their objectives. Understandably, the Arakan-bound channel proposal has triggered intense reactions in Bangladesh from the outset. Many questions have arisen: who will manage this channel—Bangladesh or the UN? What kind of supplies will be transported through it, and will the Rohingya refugees be involved in their distribution? Most importantly, who will ensure the channel’s security? If Myanmar’s armed forces object to the channel, or if China or India raise objections, who will be responsible for its protection? Will this require the creation of a “no-fly zone” or a similar security arrangement?
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Matters related to the channel’s security and management—including the possibility of a no-fly zone—are inevitably tied to military considerations, making this a highly sensitive issue. If there were a functioning parliament in the country, elected representatives would undoubtedly have deliberated on these matters. However, it appears that the interim government is yet to consult political leaders on this sensitive topic.
Senior officials of the government have issued contradictory statements regarding the channel. Initially, one adviser claimed that the government had agreed in principle to the proposal, subject to certain conditions. Another official stated that there had been no discussion on the matter. Later, it was said from the government’s side that it was not considering a “corridor,” rather a “channel.” These disjointed and conflicting remarks have sparked public concern regarding the southern border.
Bangladesh’s top priority regarding Myanmar and Arakan must be the repatriation of Rohingya and the prevention of further entries. Given the current situation in Arakan, any repatriation will require the consent and cooperation of the Arakan Army. At the same time, Myanmar remains a sovereign state with a functioning government in Naypyidaw, meaning their consent will also be needed for establishing a channel in Arakan. Only with the agreement of all parties can any humanitarian aid initiative be considered. And in that case, the primary condition must be the refugees’ return. However, it remains unclear whether this crucial issue has been included in the current initiative. Without sufficient dialogue with political stakeholders on such a nationally critical and militarily sensitive matter, the country risks future controversies and divisions. Joining a military-style international initiative without a broad national consensus undoubtedly entails significant risk. The question, then, arises: does the current government have the authority to make such high-stake decisions unilaterally?
Though this government, formed through a mass uprising, has popular support, it remains unelected. The country is witnessing significant political tensions and uncertainty about when the next election will be held. In such a context, the prospect of establishing a humanitarian channel towards Arakan has added a new dimension to that. Moreover, some fear that a channel at the border could trigger military consequences. Considering the overall situation across our borders and the societal reverberations of the India-Pakistan war, there are reasons for concern. Are the people of Bangladesh being unwillingly dragged into the psychological and strategic orbit of a multi-front conflict, or have they already been entangled in one?
Altaf Parvez is a researcher and writer.
Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.
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