Rumors spread like wildfire, and the recent buzz around Rohingya repatriation talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar is no exception. The unverified claims, fueled by social media and speculative reports, raise questions: Is there any substance to these discussions, or are they merely exaggerated narratives?
On April 4, 2025, Bangladesh’s interim government’s press wing announced that Myanmar’s junta had confirmed 180,000 Rohingya refugees are eligible for repatriation, with an additional 70,000 under review followed a meeting on the sideline of the 6th BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok between Khalilur Rahman, High Representative of Bangladesh’s interim government and Then Swe, Myanmar’s deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister However, Myanmar’s silence on the matter casts doubts on the legitimacy and feasibility of such an agreement or talks. We may say, without official confirmation or a clear implementation framework, skepticism is justified.
The first hurdle to repatriation lies in Myanmar’s fractured political landscape. Rakhine State, the epicenter of the Rohingya crisis, is a battleground for multiple armed groups, including the ruling junta, the Arakan Army (AA), and the National Unity Government’s (NUG) People’s Defense Force (PDF). Although the AA and NUG share a common enemy in the junta, their conflicting ideologies—particularly regarding Rakhine nationalism and democratic governance—complicate any unified approach to Rohingya repatriation.
Moreover, it may palpable that the junta has lost control over 86% of Myanmar’s townships, home to 67% of its population. In Rakhine, the AA has seized nearly the entire state, including key cities like Sittwe and Kyaukpyu. If the military regime lacks authority in the region, how can it guarantee the safe return of Rohingya refugees? The absence of territorial control undermines the credibility of any repatriation agreement.
If we look at the previous Rohingya repatriation deal, Myanmar’s track record on Rohingya repatriation is riddled with broken promises. Following the 2017 exodus against Rohingya minority in Rakhine state, Bangladesh and Aung San Suu Kyi’s government signed a repatriation agreement under the 1992-93 Rohingya refugee pact framework, pledging to return 1,500 Rohingya weekly. Yet, two attempts—in 2018 and 2019—collapsed due to legitimate safety concerns of Rohingya minority in Rakhine state.
In October 2023, a China-brokered pilot repatriation deal for 1,176 refugees also stalled amid objections from refugees and human rights groups. These failures highlight a recurring pattern: Myanmar’s assurances lack enforceability, and returning Rohingya face systemic persecution. Even if a new agreement is signed, past experiences suggest it may suffer the same fate unless robust international oversight is implemented.
Historical background and attitude towards Rohingya people point it out explicitly. The Rohingya remain unwanted by all factions in Myanmar including NUG, Tatmadaw and AA. While the military orchestrated the 2017 genocide, Suu Kyi’s government failed to intervene, even defending the atrocities at the International Court of Justice. The AA, though uninvolved in the massacres, adheres to a Rakhine nationalist ideology that rejects Rohingya citizenship claims. Additionally, clashes between the AA and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) further endanger Rohingya civilians securely repatriate.
Given this hostility, repatriation without guarantees of citizenship, safety, and political inclusion is a recipe for renewed violence. Without addressing the root causes of persecution—state-sponsored discrimination and exclusionary nationalism—any agreement risks becoming another empty gesture.
For Bangladesh, hosting over 1.2 million Rohingya refugees has become an unsustainable crisis. The strain on resources, environmental degradation in Cox’s Bazar, and rising cross-border crime—particularly drug trafficking—pose severe challenges. While repatriation is the most viable solution, the path forward remains fraught with obstacles.
As though Bangladesh have not much more military capability, military intervention in Rakhine state is not a realistic option. It would escalate regional instability and face opposition from China and India, both of which have strategic and economic stakes in Myanmar. Instead, Bangladesh must leverage diplomatic avenues by pushing for inclusive dialogue involving the junta, NUG, AA, and Rohingya representatives to address citizenship and security. It might use international lobbying Mobilize the United Nations, United States, European Union, and ASEAN to hold Myanmar accountable, ensuring repatriation is voluntary, safe, and dignified. In this occasion, regional cooperation would make a positive change. Bangladesh might work with China and India, both influential in Myanmar and have good friendship with Bangladesh to broker a sustainable solution.
In conclusion, I may assume that the BIMSTEC sideline talks, while a potential diplomatic opening, do not guarantee imminent repatriation. Bangladesh must avoid rushed agreements and instead pursue a comprehensive, internationally backed framework. The Rohingya crisis demands more than piecemeal solutions—it requires addressing Myanmar’s institutionalized discrimination and ensuring all factions commit to a lasting resolution. Until then, skepticism toward unilateral announcements remains prudent. The world must not look away while the Rohingya remain trapped in limbo, caught between geopolitical interests and Myanmar’s cycle of violence.
Sauid Ahmed Khan
Sauid Ahmed Khan is a Freelance Contributor and based in Bangladesh.
