Myanmar’s junta government has declared that 180,000 Rohingya individuals are ‘eligible’ for repatriation from Bangladesh. This declaration, made during diplomatic engagements on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC summit, comes after six years of dragging its feet on the process. Yet, the declaration raises more questions than it answers: Can repatriation be truly meaningful without engaging the Arakan Army (AA), which now controls most of Rakhine State, the Rohingyas’ homeland? And who should Bangladesh engage with, the de jure military government in Naypyidaw or the de facto rulers of Rakhine?
Rohingya Repatriation: Reality or Rhetoric?
Since launching ‘Operation 1027’ in late 2023 as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Arakan Army has overrun 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships and taken control of Paletwa in Chin State. Major Rohingya population centres —Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung and Kyaukphyu — are now effectively under AA control. Only Sittwe, the capital, remains tenuously in junta hands but even that is encircled by AA forces. This situation fundamentally undercuts Naypyidaw’s capacity to guarantee safe and voluntary repatriation. The junta cannot enforce security or guarantee civil rights in territories it does not control. Even humanitarian access to these areas would be impossible without AA’s consent.
Against this backdrop, Myanmar’s sudden willingness to accept 180,000 verified Rohingyas seems more performative than genuine. The verification process itself, launched between 2018 and 2020, took six years just to confirm this limited number, leaving out over 600,000 from the original list. Worse, some 150,000 Rohingya children have been born in the camps since 2017. There is no clarity on their legal status or whether Myanmar would accept them. This timeline underscores a core issue: repatriation is being used as a diplomatic tool, not as a sincere humanitarian or political effort. Myanmar has neither built infrastructure to receive the returnees nor demonstrated a political shift towards reconciliation or justice.
With the Arakan Army now controlling over 90% of Rakhine, the Bangladesh government faces a strategic conundrum. To whom should it speak? Any plan involving repatriation — whether safe zones, humanitarian corridors or pilot projects — requires ground-level security and cooperation. The AA holds the operational levers now. In 2022, AA Chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing said that he considered Rohingyas to be citizens of Myanmar. However, since ‘Operation 1027’, their rhetoric has cooled. They now avoid the term “Rohingya” altogether, referring to them as the ‘Muslim community of Arakan’. The AA has also accused some Rohingya factions of aligning with the Myanmar military—further deepening mistrust.
As a state actor, Bangladesh cannot officially engage with a non-state armed group without risking international legal implications. Yet, not engaging the AA renders any repatriation plan moot. UN Secretary-General António Guterres, during his recent visit to the Rohingya camps, hinted that a solution may lie in creating humanitarian corridors with the cooperation of regional powers and local actors, including the Arakan Army.
Meantime, on 1 April, the Three Brotherhood Alliance announced a temporary ceasefire for humanitarian purposes after a major earthquake. While the declaration suspends offensive operations, the alliance, including the AA, will still defend its territory if provoked. This pause is being hailed by some as an opening to resume dialogue on Rohingya return. Yet, concurrent reports from The Irrawaddy confirm escalating clashes between the junta and the AA in Ayeyarwady region bordering Rakhine. Civilian traffic is blocked, rural outposts are being abandoned by junta forces and roads like Pathein-Monywa remain inaccessible. These facts paint a picture of ongoing volatility.
Under such circumstances, even if some form of repatriation is managed, hypothetically, what awaits the Rohingyas in Rakhine? Their homes were razed. Their villages were erased from maps. Mega infrastructure projects, backed by China, India and Russia, are now underway in areas once inhabited by Rohingyas. Additionally, the security risks for returnees are enormous. Without full citizenship, civil rights or protection from militia groups (both state and non-state), Rohingya returnees could be weaponised in the ongoing civil war.
International law mandates that repatriation must be voluntary, safe and dignified. But after six years in limbo, many Rohingyas, particularly those born in camps, lack connection to the land they are being asked to return to. With trauma, uncertainty and fear shaping their worldview, voluntariness cannot be manufactured through diplomatic agreements alone. Worse still, there are rumours that Myanmar’s military is planning to return Rohingyas only to exploit them as pawns—using them for leverage or even as a buffer force against the Arakan Army. Such manipulation could lead to renewed cycles of violence.
Therefore, the current situation demands a radically different diplomatic architecture. A trilateral or even quadrilateral dialogue involving Bangladesh, the Myanmar junta, the Arakan Army and international stakeholders like the UN, ASEAN and China is essential. The idea of a humanitarian corridor, as raised by the UN Secretary-General and echoed by the Principal Advisor of Bangladesh, holds potential. However, implementation would require agreement between warring factions. There is also historical precedence for “safe havens” or “buffer states,” such as in northern Iraq for Kurds or eastern Congo for refugees. Such arrangements are not simple, but they may offer the only feasible path forward. Some even suggest that a quasi-autonomous Rakhine or a neutral buffer zone monitored by international peacekeepers, could serve as a staging ground for future repatriation.
However, China, India, Russia and the U.S. all have varying interests in the region. China’s Belt and Road investments and India’s Act East Policy rely on a stable Rakhine. If repatriation destabilises these investments, these powers may push back. However, if it aligns with their strategic narratives such as reducing refugee pressure on Bangladesh and enhancing connectivity, they may support innovative frameworks. Turkey and the OIC countries could also play a role, especially in humanitarian aspects. A larger international coalition could apply leverage over both the junta and the Arakan Army to arrive at a working consensus.
Still, hope persists, not because of vague declarations or political pageantry but because of the resilience of the Rohingya people. For them, the idea of celebrating Eid in their ancestral homeland is not just a dream, it is a right— a right that demands more than speeches. It demands structure, sincerity and the courage to engage even the most inconvenient actors in search of peace.
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The writer is a physician and
international award-winning youth leader of Bangladesh. He can be reached at
md.rakibalhasan.bd@gmail.com
