THE ongoing civil war in Myanmar is one of Asia’s most chronic and dangerous crises, located at the very heart of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The February 2021 military coup did not simply derail the country’s democratic aspirations. It created one of the most complex security knots in today’s international system. Myanmar’s conflict is no longer confined to generals in Naypyidaw. From the eastern borderlands to the central plains, and from the north to the west, the conflict has evolved into a multi-front nationwide conflict war. A symbolic turning point was the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s ‘1027 Operation,’ launched in late 2023. It changed both the battlefield and regional diplomacy by focusing on junta strongholds in the north. China was compelled to act as a mediator after exerting influence behind the scenes for a considerable period. Although the war’s pace was temporarily slowed by ceasefires in January 2024 and January 2025, there was no long-term peace. Tensions between the Arakan Army and Buddhist militias continue in Rakhine, and civilian resistance remains resolute in Sagaing.
One of the most striking aspects of Myanmar’s war is the way it spills across borders. Bangladesh has already lost civilians to stray artillery shells and continues to carry the burden of one of the world’s largest refugee crises. Over 1.2 million Rohingyas live in camps in Cox’s Bazar and surrounding areas. Each airstrike in Rakhine raises the possibility of a new wave of displacement. Thailand saw thousands of civilians attempting to cross the Moei River into Mae Sot during clashes around Myawaddy. Laos has been silently but deeply harmed by the expansion of the narcotics economy across the Golden Triangle. For China, both border security and billions of dollars in Belt and Road projects are at stake. Unrest in Yunnan is not only a security problem for Beijing, but also a matter of prestige. In short, Myanmar’s war is not a domestic affair. It sits at the centre of multinational humanitarian crises, weapons and narcotics trafficking, cross-border trade disruptions and the solidity of the Indo-Pacific order itself.
One of the key factors deepening this crisis is the effective breakdown of global arms control mechanisms. The United Nations has not imposed a binding arms embargo on Myanmar. Instead, a patchwork of sanctions by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and a few others exists. But these partial measures are no match for the complexity of global supply chains. The junta’s air force continues to find aviation fuel, spare parts, drones, and surveillance technologies. According to UN reports in 2024, aviation fuel shipments are often rerouted through third countries. Loopholes in banking systems allow companies to transfer ‘dual-use’ goods with relative ease. This keeps the junta’s air power alive. Villages are still bombed because warplanes can still be fuelled. At the same time, the war feeds, and is fed by, a criminalised economy. The Golden Triangle has become the world’s largest production hub for synthetic drugs. Pills, crystal meth, and heroin flow from Myanmar into Southeast Asia and onward to Australia and Japan. Armed groups generate billions of dollars by taxing and protecting this trade. Border checkpoints function not only as trade gateways but also as revenue sources for both sides. Myawaddy, in particular, has become the nerve centre of this wartime economy. The result is a vicious cycle. War sustains the illicit economy, and the illicit economy sustains the war. Neither international sanctions nor regional governments have been able to break it.
India occupies a unique position in this conflict. Sharing a 1,600 kilometre border with Myanmar, India’s own fragile north-eastern states are directly affected. Ethnic skirmish in Manipur has been exacerbated by the cross-border movement of weapons and militants. In February 2024, India suspended the long-standing free movement regime and began erecting fences along its border. Indian policy follows a dual strategy. On one level, it keeps channels open with the junta to protect security interests and infrastructure projects. On another level, it maintains backdoor contacts with opposition parties. It is as much an opportunity as it is a risk. The opportunity lies in India’s ability to project itself as a mediator and security guarantor. The risk lies in appearing to neighbours as if it is playing a double game. Some allegations suggest that India has turned a blind eye to cross-border criminal syndicates, though no concrete evidence exists. The deeper problem is porous frontiers and entrenched smuggling routes.
India’s credibility will depend on how transparent it is in dealing with this. Joint intelligence-sharing, coordinated border patrols and regional exercises could strengthen that transparency. Given the war’s current course, there is little chance of peace in the upcoming years. China’s mediation may calm the Yunnan border, but Rakhine remains unstable and could experience another Rohingya exodus at any time. Sagaing’s resistance continues to be a persistent thorn in the junta’s side. Conflicts in Karen state increase the likelihood of unintentional escalation with Thai security forces. The situation in the Rohingya camps is among the most serious dangers. By 2025, international funding has fallen to crisis levels, and medical and food aid are on the verge of collapse. Militant recruitment and human trafficking thrive in this environment. A humanitarian crisis could rapidly escalate into a security crisis.
In this context, the neighbours do not need a grand, unrealistic peace plan. What they need are small but concrete measures. Bangladesh, China, Laos and Thailand should establish permanent crisis cells fixated on three core issues which are border incidents, trade chokepoints and refugee flows respectively. Hotlines should be maintained and daily incident logs shared. Border gates should use standardized customs seals and revenue collected there should be placed in transparent accounts to prevent competition over rents. Targeted controls are also possible. Aviation fuel, dual-use electronics and precursor chemicals for methamphetamine should be placed under tighter scrutiny. Cutting off these flows would reduce the most destructive tools of the war. At the same time, a multi-year ‘Rohingya Stabilisation Fund’ should be created, linking aid directly to security benchmarks. This would lessen the burden on Bangladesh and reduce the likelihood of radicalisation. These actions might buy some breathing room, but they might not stop the war. They would maintain ceasefires, foster a semblance of neighbourly trust, and above all, avoid the Myanmar crisis from causing instability throughout the Indo-Pacific area. Myanmar’s conflict is no longer the concern of generals in Naypyidaw or insurgents in the hills alone. It is a systemic crisis that threatens the security architecture of the entire region. The neighbours face a choice. They can wait indefinitely for a distant, perfect peace agreement, or they can act now with small, realistic and cooperative steps that reduce the spillover risks.
The choice made today will shape tomorrow’s Indo-Pacific order. Myanmar’s war is unlikely to end soon. But through smart, targeted and collaborative measures, the collapse of the broader region can still be averted.
MT Rahman Umair is a national security analyst, AI policy specialist, and critical applied linguist. He is also a government savant under the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, and is currently working as a senior researcher at a European research laboratory in Eastern Europe.
