A Guest Column by Zo Tum Hmung and Billy Ford published in Irrawaddy.com
The evolving crisis in Myanmar is a critical test for U.S.-India relations, regional stability, and the future balance of power in the region. As the junta continues to cede ground to resistance forces in Myanmar, Washington and New Delhi face pressure to recalibrate their policies not only to protect their interests but also to counterbalance growing Chinese influence.
Recent high-level exchanges have highlighted the potential for deeper ties between the two countries. During his visit to India in April, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance emphasized a reorientation in American foreign policy from soft to hard power, framing the U.S.-India partnership as grounded in “peace through mutual strength”—a strategy he described as central to maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. His visit also spotlighted personal and cultural connections, reflecting a broader effort to strengthen bilateral ties.
Myanmar is an important testing ground for a renewed U.S.-India partnership, but fundamental questions remain unresolved. Will an ambitious India continue to accept a military dictatorship on its eastern border that hinders progress on its Act East Policy and undermines security in its restive northeast? And can a retrenching U.S. find a regional partner to take on a greater share of the burden of preventing China from dominating Myanmar and shifting the regional balance of power in its favor?
A regional flashpoint
Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar has descended into a protracted conflict. The junta’s grip on the country has steadily weakened as the resistance made gains across numerous fronts. The regime now controls roughly 21 percent of the country’s territory, but it remains in place primarily because of its absolute advantage in airpower and growing support from China, which aims to divide and weaken the resistance movement.
The conflict has profound implications for India—not only its geopolitical ambitions but its security, particularly along its volatile northeastern border. Insurgent activity, refugee flows, and threats to strategic infrastructure such as the planned Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project through Myanmar’s Sittwe port have forced India to reassess its historically cautious approach. Meanwhile, the U.S. has established a strong policy framework for supporting the resistance movement under the BURMA Act, but has been reticent to implement it in earnest, partly because it lacks a regional partner. A burden-sharing partner is even more important now that the Trump administration has gutted key foreign policy institutions, slashed foreign assistance, and adopted a more transactional foreign policy posture.
Competition with China
The U.S. and India are acutely aware of China’s expanding footprint in Myanmar. For the first few years after the coup, China hedged its position—providing support to the junta as well as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that could further its interests. But when a series of historic resistance gains threatened the junta’s viability, Beijing shifted its support fully behind the regime in August 2024. Since then, China has brokered ceasefire talks on terms favorable to the junta, most notably coercing the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to surrender its greatest military gain to the junta, and using its considerable leverage to force the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to halt military offensives.
China has adopted a bold posture, making it the only international player capable of meaningfully influencing the trajectory of the conflict. Other countries have equivocated or engaged so cautiously that they have had little substantive effect, so China is unilaterally shaping the conflict to serve its long-term interests, gaining access to vast stores of rare earth minerals and establishing a security presence on Myanmar’s coastline that could enable it to project maritime power into the Indian Ocean for the first time. The only groups standing up against China’s incursion into Myanmar are the Myanmar public and the resistance movement.
By sharing the burden of supporting this movement, the U.S. and India could disrupt China’s singular dominance in Myanmar and weaken the junta to the point where it will negotiate. A negotiated settlement based upon the aspirations of the resistance movement—rather than those of the widely reviled military—is the only path to stability in Myanmar. It would also have a range of other effects, such as reducing harm to Americans and Indians who have been victims of cyberscams and drug trafficking; opening new economic opportunities for both countries, including access to rare earth and energy resources; and enabling the emergence of a self-reliant Myanmar that is no longer a regional liability but a partner.
India’s policy
India’s approach to Myanmar has historically balanced tentative support for democracy with engaging whoever holds power in Naypyitaw. Following the 2021 coup, India refrained from outright condemnation, maintaining diplomatic ties with the junta. This approach partly stems from India having previously lost influence when it condemned the military for rejecting the 1990 election results in Myanmar and ushering in another period of brutal dictatorship. It is also a result of a mistaken belief in New Delhi that the military will always be the dominant political force in Myanmar.
India has spent most of the post-coup period deploying a watered-down version of China’s approach—quietly interacting with resistance groups to achieve minor concessions while providing the junta with legitimacy and material assistance, including weapons. But rather than enabling India to build leverage, this approach has only helped sustain China’s proxy regime and prolonged the war. Because of its tentative approach, India has failed to build influence with any of the key stakeholders in Myanmar.
However, the advances of resistance forces since late 2023 have forced India to reassess. Resistance groups now control virtually the entire India-Myanmar border. In response, India has shown greater openness to engaging them, particularly those along its border: the KIA’s political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization; the Arakan Army (AA)’s political wing, the United League of Arakan; Chin resistance groups; and the parallel National Unity Government.
It currently enjoys little trust or influence with these groups, but that could change if it deepens its engagement and ends direct support for the junta. Notably, trust has been strained by a recent deadly clash between resistance forces and the paramilitary Assam Rifles, in which 10 resistance fighters were killed and their bodies reportedly showed signs of torture.
Of course, India does not have to go it alone. It could collaborate with the U.S., which maintains long-standing connections across the resistance movement, to build constructive relationships with the groups along its border.
U.S. policy
Like India’s, the U.S.’ response to Myanmar’s crisis has been shaped by the misconception that the junta is unlikely to be defeated. Given this premise, and the perception that America has few interests in Myanmar, American policymakers have determined that robust engagement is simply not worth it. This has led to a cautious policy that has emboldened Beijing and left the resistance movement isolated. It has also directly harmed Americans, who lose billions to cyberscammers in Myanmar each year or who suffer the ills of addiction to meth and opium, drugs for which Myanmar is the world’s leading producer.
Despite the passage of the 2022 BURMA Act, which authorizes non-lethal assistance to resistance groups, implementation has lagged. In addition to massive cuts by the Trump Administration to foreign assistance, the U.S. is constrained by its physical distance from Myanmar. Partnership with India would reduce that burden and would open new pathways for more effective and efficient implementation of U.S. policy.
U.S.-India cooperation
The convergence of U.S. and Indian interests in Myanmar provides a foundation for coordinated action. In the long term, both countries seek a more open Myanmar that does not serve as a base for China’s strategic ambitions; a more self-reliant Myanmar that is no longer a regional burden; and a more stable Myanmar for critical infrastructure projects and other investments.
In the near-term, greater Indian engagement with resistance groups would create a pathway for a more isolated U.S. to remain engaged through a burden-sharing partnership. A U.S.-Indian partnership would also offer a viable counterweight to Chinese domination.
To achieve these goals, the U.S. and India could collaborate in the following ways:
Deepen engagement with resistance groups: Both countries should expand dialogue with the resistance forces that control nearly the entire India-Myanmar border as well as most of Rakhine State, Chin State, and Kachin State as well as parts of Sagaing and Magway regions. They should support political dialogue among a broad range of resistance organizations. Unlike China’s efforts to broker bilateral ceasefires that benefit the junta and increase the likelihood of national fragmentation, an intra-resistance dialogue facilitated by the U.S. and India could help achieve a shared political vision for the future that would be the basis for a future national dialogue involving the Myanmar military.
Such an effort could bring together recent convenings by India that aimed to create intra-resistance cohesion and intra-resistance political dialogue hosted by the U.S. in late 2024. Given the fraught political dynamics among ASEAN members, India and the U.S. may be best positioned to instigate such a process and offer an alternate political path to the one prescribed by China.
Channel non-lethal assistance through India’s northeast:
The U.S. should work with India to channel non-lethal assistance like food, medicine, communications equipment, early warning systems, civilian drones, and technical support for resistance governance structures. It should appropriate US$121 million for assistance consistent with the BURMA Act and prior appropriations, and explore enhanced burden-sharing with India on additional non-lethal assistance. Assistance through Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh to resistance groups on the border leveraging India’s geographic proximity and established networks also minimizes the risk of direct confrontation with the junta and enables U.S. assistance to reach Sagaing, which is the region worst affected by war and the earthquake, but which has received minimal support.
Pressure the junta and reject its sham election:
The U.S. should continue to apply economic and political pressure on the junta, and India should end assistance to the regime. If the Myanmar military engages in a dialogue from a position of strength, that dialogue, like the many attempts of the past, will fail. For dialogue to be successful, the military must participate from a position of weakness, if not surrender. That means it must be weakened through international initiatives of targeted resource denial, arms and jet fuel embargos, and political isolation.
The U.S. and India must also respect the will of the Myanmar people and oppose the junta’s effort to stage a sham election, which is supported by just nine percent of the Myanmar public and clearly aimed at cementing long-term military rule.
The upcoming Quad summit in New Delhi presents an opportunity to initiate these efforts and align U.S., Indian, Japanese, and Australian policies on Myanmar. Joint statements, intelligence sharing, and coordinated initiatives to support the resistance movement can amplify the impact of U.S.-India bilateral efforts.
Myanmar’s crisis offers a testing ground for a new and more robust U.S.-India partnership. The stakes extend far beyond the country’s borders, implicating the balance of power in Southeast Asia. By moving beyond the cautious approach that has emboldened China over the past four years, a new U.S.-India partnership rooted in principles and pragmatism could help bring about a more stable, democratic, and self-reliant Myanmar. The time for joint action is now, before the window for meaningful influence closes.
Billy Ford is an analyst with the Southeast Asia Peace Institute. Zo Tum Hmung is President and CEO of the Burma Research Institute.
