“Young people are resisting and are on the front lines, but at the same time, other people are caring for the population and rebuilding the country. It’s not a revolution that looks to the future, to the post-revolution, but rather acts now, simultaneously.”
Interview with Andrea Castronuovo, who is a researcher at the Catholic University of Milan and a collaborator with the “Amicizia Italia Burma” association. He currently resides in a border town between Thailand and Myanmar, which has long been a meeting place for those fleeing political persecution by the Burmese junta and home to numerous refugee camps.
Why did you choose to live here in this border area?
I arrived shortly after the military coup of February 1, 2021. For decades, this has been a refuge for democratic movements, from the 1988 uprising and then the 2007 uprising until now. It is a haven for all the activists and members of the country’s active democratic politics who, no longer safe in Myanmar, were forced to reach this place with extreme difficulty. In this city between Thailand and Myanmar, along with political refugees, there are refugee camps created by the internal war in Myanmar.
Who are these young democrats who left their country?
These are the young people who demonstrated against the coup in the early months of 2021. From mid-February 2021, through March and April, there was an increasingly violent crackdown by the military, some individuals who had exposed themselves, especially in civil society and political circles, but above all, many young people fled. They took cars and public or private transportation, mostly makeshift vehicles, leaving everything behind, including their families, without telling anyone because their wanted status endangered them and, more importantly, their families. Once they crossed the border, they found themselves in a unique situation because Thailand did not ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, and this means that the Thai government does not recognize refugee status and, more importantly, has no obligation to provide assistance, whether physical or with documentation. Therefore, almost all of the young Burmese who have arrived here find themselves in a no-man’s land.
What is their life like at the border?
They continue their resistance. Many young people are engaged in journalism, whether as university students or professors. They have dropped out of school and are engaging in civil disobedience. They do not recognize the current government, the junta, as the legitimate government. They have chosen to become refugees and persecuted, and they continue their ideological struggles and their efforts to assist the population.
Even though the Thai authorities have not formally recognized the refugees, what is their attitude towards them?
We’re off any tourist route, outside any commercial dimension; this place thrives solely because it’s overpopulated by refugees. This has become the city’s only economic dimension, and a system of direct and indirect corruption has been created within which illegal Burmese refugees fleeing war and bombings, who have suffered extremely profound trauma, find themselves in a situation of insecurity because they’re exposed to these dynamics of corruption. Local authorities see an opportunity to extort money from the illegal Burmese currently in the city; the police are absolutely no friends of the Burmese, but on the other hand, they make a living from them. Illegal refugees benefit from not being locked up in refugee camps, but from living in an urban environment. In short, there’s a refugee-based economy, and it’s essentially an economy of exploitation.
Can you confirm that women have a significant presence in the Burmese resistance?
Absolutely. After February 1, 2021, there was a democratic will among the population to steer Burma in that direction and not push it backwards as the military is doing. This democratic will is expressed in resistance in multiple dimensions, that of “we no longer accept the abuses and the will of the military” and that of a shift in the social gender paradigm. In fact, women, students, doctors, and nurses immediately took the reins of the resistance. There are female ministers who are now part of the “Democratic Representation of the People” government, there are entire resistance battalions that are made up exclusively of women, several of them, there are mixed battalions, too. In short, there is incredible work being done. Another important resistance organization brings together women democratic parliamentarians from across Myanmar, who continue to carry out, in addition to their political activities, civil assistance and educational activities, and the reconstruction of the former education and healthcare systems, which have unfortunately been lost in recent years after COVID. Thus, the female dimension of the resistance is active in all its phases and in all roles.
Some analysts say that 60% of Burmese territory is in the hands of the resistance.
The problem is always the definition of what control is. There are undoubtedly entire areas of the country where the military cannot get out of their own compound, from their limited spheres of influence and most of the rural territories are beyond their control in the sense that they cannot even physically reach the battlefields; the only way to slow down or hit the resistance is through aerial bombardment.
Within the territories where the resistance is present, it has activated an education system, a healthcare system, and a communication system between the villages, so there is control of the territory, which is very difficult to quantify at this time, especially from the outside.
What are the characteristics that distinguish the Burmese resistance?
There are a couple of elements that I think are crucial. The first is that no one expected a nationwide resistance, shared by all the people, and peaceful! Nor did anyone expect a transformation from a totally peaceful resistance to an armed one, essentially defensive, to protect the population from military brutality, even though the civil disobedience actions continue, confirming that this is not just an armed revolution. It’s fair to say that civil disobedience and armed resistance have merged, rather than one having absorbed the other.
The resistance has continued to grow over the past four years, and the military has been unable to halt it, which is undoubtedly a positive development. We can safely say that the military will never regain control as it did in past decades. Regarding the development of the country’s democratic struggle, it is possible that their steady progress will also coincide with a progressive worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. I believe there is room for reflection on this, especially with regard to international organizations, international actors, and all citizens who experience active citizenship as something that extends beyond their own borders. We should all work together to address how to alleviate the suffering of the population.
The increasingly evident formation of semi-organized and organized structures, which are re-establishing the health, education and social assistance systems, completely absent in the last two years, are elements which tell us that the reconstruction of the country is not being postponed until tomorrow. In my opinion this is the special feature of this resistance: young people are resisting and are at the front, but at the same time, others are caring and rebuilding the country. It’s not a revolution that looks to the future, to the post-revolution, but rather acts now, simultaneously. Essentially, it’s a grassroots resistance and revolution that works directly on the ground, rebuilding and healing the damage done by the junta over the past decades. This has resulted in the population becoming increasingly supportive of the resistance and alienating themselves from the military forces.
Does the Burmese diaspora abroad play an important role in supporting the resistance?
Yes, absolutely. Fundraising began immediately, and the Burmese community in Italy also organizes numerous initiatives. It varies from community to community; for example, in the United States and England, the communities are very large and have significant financial support capabilities. They also try to maintain high levels of awareness in their respective countries.
It’s absolutely true that the diaspora has helped and continues to help the resistance, however, this support is likely to gradually diminish. It’s one thing to support the first five, six, seven, or eight months, but quite another to set aside money and send it to Burma for years. The financial flows are primarily needed for the refugee camps and the humanitarian emergency, and the resistance is increasingly relying on internal donations from the Burmese people themselves.
Aung San Suu Kyi is out of the game, locked up, but I think she remains as a symbol of democracy for her people.
In the many Burmese restaurants that have sprung up in various corners of the city, and in almost all cases, once you have passed the main room and gone to the back of these premises, there is always a portrait of Aung San Suu Kyi, hidden away.
But I think it’s fair to point out that while Aung San Suu Kyi has long been the sole pillar—at least that’s what we’ve perceived from the outside, right now—pillars that are shaping and sustaining the people and the democratic vision, are many besides hers. Many young people who organized the protests have become leaders in their cities, true points of reference for activism, society, politics, and democracy. There’s a greater distribution of this responsibility for carrying forward the democratic dream, somehow, without forgetting what has happened. It’s a new phase, a very transformative phase, and it’s young people who are leading this resistance, this civil disobedience, on the front lines. But going around and talking to people, there’s always a reference, there’s always an attachment to the figure of Aung San Suu Kyi.
