Since the launch of the Rakhine version of Operation 1027 in November 2023, the Arakan Army (AA), dubbed the Rakhine Tatmadaw (Rakhine Army), has now taken control of 14 out of 17 townships in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. This has effectively established its dominance in the Rakhine by repelling Myanmar’s Tatmadaw backed State Administration Council (SAC) forces. As of December 2024, the AA had also taken complete control over 271 kilometers of the Myanmar side of the border with Bangladesh, effectively establishing itself as the new neighbor of Dhaka. This spontaneous rise of AA has sparked public debates, especially among Bangladesh’s security planners, practitioners, and scholars, primarily concerning the future of Rohingya refugee repatriation, informal engagement with the AA, and prospects for a humanitarian aid corridor into Rakhine. Before taking crucial policy decisions on any of the above issues, it is essential to address and analyze the security threats that Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), such as AA, can pose to Bangladesh’s national security.
Arakan Army-Rohingya Tensions
The first core security concern for Bangladesh will be the growing tensions between AA and the Rohingyas. In Rakhine, as per credible evidence provided by various human rights groups, AA has been involved in multiple forms of Rohingya persecution. These include targeted killings of the unarmed Rohingyas, arbitrary detention, and forced displacement from their homes. Since Operation 1027, about 118,000 Rohingyas have newly entered Bangladesh. These Rohingyas have crossed the border in fear for their lives. AA controls all the Myanmar side of the frontier with Bangladesh, along with the major townships in Northern Rakhine where the Rohingyas are predominantly based. Thus, it is highly likely that these Rohingyas are escaping their homeland in fear of AA’s wrath. This can also be linked to the fact that the Tatmadaw has been battling for its survival. Since the fall of its Western Command in December 2024, no significant garrison has existed alongside Northern Rakhine. Therefore, it is very clear that AA has become the new force to displace these Rohingyas from Rakhine.
There are also valid reasons to attribute the AA’s ethno-nationalist views as a source of ongoing ethnic tension. First, the group’s ideology is rooted in the ‘Arakan Dream,’ which aims to establish an independent and homogeneous Rakhine State through its ultranationalist ideology, ‘Way of Rakhita.’ This calls for restoring the glorious status of Arakan State by liberating it, which was lost due to the Bamar invasion and later through British colonial occupation in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The AA’s leader, Twan Mrat Naing, had always maintained an ambiguous position on defining the status of the Rohingyas under AA’s rule. His ethnic army had even termed Rohingyas as ‘Bengali Terrorists’ in some instances, reflecting a similar view to the Tatmadaw that Rohingyas illegally immigrated into Rakhine after the fall of the Arakanese Kingdom.
Adding to the dimension of ethnic tension is the recent collaboration of Rohingya Armed Groups (RAGs) like Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), etc., with the junta forces. These groups are now recruiting (both actively and forcefully) from the Rohingya camps of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh to fight against the AA by allying with the SAC forces. SAC forces, in exchange, had provided these RAGs with weapons, ammunition, and logistical support to enhance their operational capabilities. Such ironic collaboration between the SAC and RAGs is only adding fuel to the fire of ethnic tensions in Rakhine and providing AA justification and local support to take action against the Rohingyas. These AA-Rohingya tensions are going to make the conditions for Rohingya refugee repatriation more complex, which will severely impact Bangladesh’s ability to sustain more than a million refugees amidst the ongoing funding crisis. Such a scenario will foster local tensions, which could have the potential to destabilize the southeastern region of Bangladesh.
Border Security and the Insurgency Nexus
Another major threat that the Arakan Army poses to Bangladesh’s stability is its impact on the security situation along the Bangladesh-Myanmar land and maritime border. The AA has been repeatedly targeting the fishermen of Bangladesh, abducting them, and even shooting and injuring them. However, they have returned the fishermen in most instances. Despite that, it has created a sense of fear in the areas surrounding the Naf River, which divides Bangladesh and Myanmar, and also in the strategically crucial island of Saint Martin’s.
The constant harassment and intimidation of fishermen have severely hampered the local livelihoods and earnings of the communities. Moreover, the abrupt small arms fire is a provocation to the territorial integrity of Bangladesh. It is also reported that AA wants a commission on the sea-based trade in and out of Rakhine. These are affecting the exchange of goods between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Businessmen and traders are also increasingly concerned about the safety of transport vessels due to the AA’s increasing interference in trade and commerce. Moreover, the Bangladesh-Myanmar border lacks well-secured fencing and surveillance. This has been evident from the recently reported intrusion of Arakan Army members within Bangladesh during an ethnic festival, which has sparked outrage in the public sphere. It is also important to note that AA has been reportedly involved in international drug trade, which also poses a significant challenge to Dhaka’s anti-narcotics drives through the border region.
In addition to these cross-border threats, geopolitical and security experts in Dhaka are overlooking the fact that Bangladesh not only shares borders with Rakhine State of Myanmar but also with its Chin State. This Chin state is adjacent to the Bandarban district of Bangladesh, which also falls under the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Previously, in the CHT, there had been a violent ethnic ‘Jumma Insurgency’ led by Shanti Bahini, which ended with a peace agreement with the GoB in 1997. Once, a third of the Bangladesh Army was even garrisoned in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the adjacent areas during the CHT insurgency from 1977 to 1997. Since the peace accords, the CHT has remained relatively stable, although tensions between the local Bengalis and the ethnic minorities remain high. To this day, units of the Bangladesh Army in the CHT remain actively deployed and vigilant to curb any social violence and eliminate any prospect of insurgency against the state. Despite the pragmatic presence of the Bangladesh Army, in early 2023, a new insurgent outfit, named the Kuki Chin National Front (KNF), manned mainly by Bawm ethnic minorities, began to take hold, centered around Bandarban and its peripheral zones. They targeted Army personnel via remote detonation of IEDs and mines and had also engaged in gunfights, resulting in severe casualties, including multiple deaths of military personnel.
The KNF’s recklessness was exposed when, during the peace talks with the Bangladeshi government in April 2024, its members looted two banks in daylight and raided a local police station in Thanchi of Bandarban. Since then, dozens of suspected KNF members have been arrested in joint forces operations, although their leader, Nathan Bawm, has remained on the run. Recently, thousands of KNF uniforms were discovered at a factory, sparking new speculation about the group’s activities and its nexus to Myanmar-based rebel groups. Previously, security experts had highlighted the connections between KNF and Myanmar-based rebels. Currently, the AA controls the border adjacent to Paletwa Township of Chin State. This means AA controls the Myanmar side of the border opposite of Bandarban. KNF rebels are believed to be operating from these remote terrains, crossing the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. It will not be surprising if AA arms KNF and shelters them to exert leverage over Dhaka in the ongoing unofficial engagement. Dhaka must be cautious in these aspects and should be adequately aware of KNF’s involvement with the AA or any sympathetic rebel groups based in the Chin States.
Arakan Army Territorial Ambitions and Capabilities
Bangladesh should also not rule out the potential threats emerging from the greater territorial ambitions of AA. The primary goal of AA is to restore the lost glory of the 18th-century Arakanese Kingdom by regaining its sovereignty and territorial status. The notion of regaining territorial status is somewhat problematic because the current Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the Greater Chittagong region of Bangladesh were historically part of the Arakanese Kingdom. Therefore, it shouldn’t be ruled out that AA may have ulterior motives towards these historical lands in CHT and the Greater Chittagong region, which are now under Bangladesh’s sovereign jurisdiction.
Two key developments suggest the Arakan Army might consider a greater territorial interest in the far future. First, after the AA took hold of the Paletwa Township of Chin State, which had been the center of the former Arakanese Kingdom, it refused to hand it over to other Chin rebels and established its complete control of the township. Second and foremost, the AA has launched operations into several key adjacent regions, including Bago, Magway, and Ayeyarwady. This is contrary to their vision of only acquiring control of Rakhine. These extended operations and conquests can either be part of creating a buffer against the SAC forces to ensure the substantial holding of territories won over in Rakhine, or they might be an opportunistic move to take advantage of deteriorating SAC forces and increase territorial gains. Either way, this reflects AA’s desire to establish a presence in territories outside of Rakhine, which Bangladesh should be cautious about.
The Arakan Army is a battle-hardened force that has been fighting constantly since late 2023. They have rebel allies (both ethnic and pro-democratic groups) throughout Myanmar, including the Chin, Kachin, and Shan States. It has also established logistical and intelligence apparatus through Arakan Army Auxiliaries (AAA) to enhance operational capabilities. The Rakhine Army has also established strong structures of parallel governance, which are equivalent to those of a sovereign state. Its forces have also recovered significant remnants of small to heavy weapons captured from the defeated SAC forces. The group has also aimed to capture several ammunition factories based in regions outside Rakhine State, indicating it will achieve self-reliance in producing small and medium arms, thereby creating the initial basis for an indigenous defense industrial base (DIB). These pragmatic and growing capabilities of AA can also pose a significant threat to Bangladesh’s sovereignty in the near future.
Assessing Foreign Influence
These national security threats and concerns related to the Arakan Army in Bangladesh are also not independent of any linkages to external players. Dhaka must be aware of the Chinese and Indian interests in Rakhine, as the AA has vowed to be an active protector of their economic and infrastructure projects in the region. For Beijing, Rakhine is crucial for securing an alternative route past the First and Second Island Chains in the South China Sea, where heavy US and allied military forces are deployed. Additionally, it is one of the vital regions for China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, such as the Kyaukphyu Port and special economic zone within Myanmar. For India, Rakhine is an alternative gateway into its vulnerable Northeastern Region (NER) through its flagship ‘Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-Transport Project.’ This project is key to establishing an Indian strategic foothold within Myanmar, as well counterbalancing Chinese influence.
Even for the U.S., Rakhine is now a strategic opportunity. In the past, Washington has failed to gain any significant strategic foothold in Myanmar due to an adverse relationship with the Tatmadaw’s ruling generals. This changed somewhat during the quasi-democratic period in Myanmar from 2011 to 2021, where the former US President Barack Obama even paid a landmark visit to the Southeast Asian state in 2012. However, since the military coup in February 2021, the relationship with the U.S. and the West in general has deteriorated beyond repair. The passage of the Burma Act in the US Congress, whereby the U.S. expressed its will to support the National Unity Government (NUG) and vowed non-lethal aid to pro-democratic forces further contributed to the SAC becoming closer to China and Russia. As 2024 came to a close, AA released an announcement welcoming foreign investment to Rakhine, ensuring the safety and well-being of the investors. This presents a risky yet opportunistic moment for the US government to encourage its private investors to engage in Rakhine and directly interact with the AA and its local authorities.
The surrounding geopolitics and interests of foreign actors will impact Bangladesh’s national security concerns and priorities, as they will increase the external legitimacy of the AA, which can be used to counterbalance Dhaka’s influence on the rebel group. Therefore, for Bangladesh, it is essential to assess the extent of influence AA has over China and India, and vice versa. Dhaka should continually evaluate the pragmatic approaches taken by Beijing and New Delhi, and rather than blindly following these regional powers, it must adapt its posture regarding AA to national security priorities. Dhaka should also consider the contemporary great power game, whereby, in recent decades, the Indo-Pacific has arguably become the center of the geopolitical chessboard of US-China tensions. The role of foreign actors must be assessed by Bangladesh, taking into account the context of the Indo-Pacific region.
A Way Forward
In the long run, it is rational for Bangladesh to take any decision, whether it involves the repatriation of Rohingyas, dialogue with AA, or channeling a corridor into Rakhine, keeping the above security threats, concerns, and scenarios in mind. A proactive threat assessment by Bangladesh can contribute to effective policy formulation as well as pragmatic action to deal with the new geopolitical realities in Rakhine. It will also benefit Dhaka to adopt a strategic approach in dealing with other foreign actors involved in Myanmar, which will help ensure geopolitical stability by addressing national security threats and concerns.
- Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan
- Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan is a Research Data Analyst (RDA) at the Bangladesh Peace Observatory under the Centre for Alternatives (CA), a Dhaka-based Bangladeshi think tank that focuses on international, national, and societal security and politics. He is a former ‘2024 MRDI-Fojo Media Institute Fellow in Investigative Journalism’ and a former ‘Centre for Alternatives-Sasakawa Peace Foundation Junior Fellow’ on the Project “Violent Responses to Anti-Discriminatory Student Movement: A Case Study of Bangladesh 2024.” He holds a Bachelor of Social Science in International Relations from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where he graduated as valedictorian. He can be reached at tahmidrezwan94@gmail.com.
